Storage you can challenge, not just trust
SUM Chain holds files under Proof-of-Retrievability: archive nodes are assigned chunks, must answer periodic challenges with Merkle proofs, and are rewarded or slashed accordingly. SNIP V2 is live on mainnet.
From upload to on-chain proof
- 1
Register & fund RegisterFilePendingV2
A file is registered and a fee deposit is locked into its fee pool. It enters the Pending lifecycle.
- 2
Assign chunks merkle_root
Each chunk is assigned to archive nodes by deterministic rendezvous hashing over its merkle_root, three replicas by default, snapshot-stable.
- 3
Accept assignment AcceptAssignmentV2
Assigned archives attest possession before the file activates, recorded as per-file possession bitmaps.
- 4
Challenge PoR
The chain issues deterministic retrievability challenges over (file, chunk, node) at a fixed interval.
- 5
Prove or be slashed SubmitStorageProof
A valid Merkle proof draws a reward from the fee pool; an expired challenge slashes the node’s stake.
storage.params
- replication_factor
- 3
- challenge_interval
- 100 blocks
- assignment
- rendezvous hash (BLAKE3)
- max_chunks / file
- 1,048,576
- activation_grace
- 50 blocks
Reassignment active on mainnet (activated at height 8,900,000)
Not set on mainnet (9,200,000 intended)
Two further PoR gates are code-backed but not set on mainnet: assignment targeting (por_assignment_targeting_enabled_from_height) and the assignment-aware bounded challenge scheduler (assignment_aware_por_scheduler_enabled_from_height). A live read on 2026-11-03 found both unset, so neither is active. 9,200,000 is the height #113 states as intended; setting it is a separate coordinated configuration change.
chain_getChainParams does not expose these two gates, so the status below is read live from chain_getConsensusConfig: a gate shows active only once it is set and the chain has reached it.
- por_assignment_targeting_enabled_from_heightchecking chain…
- assignment_aware_por_scheduler_enabled_from_heightchecking chain…
Pending → Active → Abandoned
Pending
Registered and funded; chunks being assigned and accepted.
Active
Assignments accepted; subject to retrievability challenges.
Abandoned
Retired after a grace period, with the remaining deposit refunded.
The chain enforces access, not encryption
Private files register an X25519 encryption-key entry per account and store per-recipient encrypted key bundles plus access metadata on-chain. The chain enforces these access-list and key-bundle rules, it does not encrypt the raw file bytes itself; that happens client-side before upload.
private_file.rules
- visibility
- public | private
- key_registry
- X25519 per account
- access_list
- on-chain, byte-capped
- key_bundles
- ~80 B per recipient
- raw_bytes
- never chain-encrypted
SNIP, the storage product surface